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Abstract
The market values of online platforms, such as Yahoo, stem from their ability to monetize
the clicks they generate for ￿rms advertising on their sites. We exploit a unique dataset on
clicks from one of Yahoo￿ s price comparison sites to estimate the determinants of clicks received
by online retailers. We ￿nd that a ￿rm enjoys a 60% jump in its clicks when it o⁄ers the lowest
price at the site. This discontinuity is consistent with a variety of models that have been
used to rationalize the price dispersion observed in online markets. We also show that one
may use estimates of the determinants of a ￿rm￿ s clicks to obtain bounds on its underlying
demand parameters, including own- and cross-price elasticities. Our results have potentially
signi￿cant rami￿cations for online retailers, platforms, and policymakers: Failure to account
for discontinuities distorts parameter estimates by 50 to 100 percent.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: D4, D8, M3, L14
11 Introduction
Clicks are the currency of the realm in online markets. Google derives nearly all of its
revenues from clicks, and now boasts a market capitalization of over $140 billion (as of
11/1/06). Google is not alone in bene￿ting from this business model; the largest online
portal, Yahoo!, derived 87% of its $5.3 billion in total revenues from pageviews in 2005. Clicks
are not only the lifeblood of search providers and portals, they also represent a signi￿cant
(and often essential) marketing cost to ￿rms competing in the online channel. For example,
the largest price listing service in the world (Yahoo￿ s European-based Kelkoo site) charges
retailers fees ranging from 40 cents to $1.90 per click and attracts over 10 million consumers
per month in the UK alone. Price comparison sites in the US, including CNet and Pricewatch,
charge online retailers similar clickthrough fees and have conversion rates of about 5% in
2002.1 At a price of $1 per click, this means that an online retailer pays the platform an
average of $20 to generate a single sale.
At price comparison sites, it is widely recognized that a particular seller￿ s price has a
lot to do with its clickthroughs and that having the ￿low product price is key.￿ 2 But how
￿key￿is it to have the low price? And how do other factors, such as screen location, ￿rm
characteristics, the number of rivals and their prices a⁄ect its clicks? The answers to these
questions are important to a variety of stakeholders including platforms, investors, and the
retail ￿rms themselves.
The extant literature on clearinghouse models o⁄ers guidance on how ￿key￿ it is to
have the low price.3 These models postulate that a mass of consumers, sometimes referred
to as ￿shoppers,￿ consult the complete list of prices displayed on the platform and buy
exclusively from the ￿rm o⁄ering the lowest price. Other consumers, who may be viewed
as ￿loyal￿ or simply uninformed, will purchase from a ￿rm even if it does not o⁄er the
lowest price. Clearinghouse models have two important implications for online markets. The
￿rst￿ that prices for homogeneous products are dispersed in equilibrium￿ has been amply
1 ￿Comparison Search Engines Tested," http://www.marketingexperiments.com on November 14, 2006.
2 See, for instance, http://www.marketingexperiments.com.
3 See, for instance, Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Shilony (1977), Rosenthal (1980), Varian (1980), Narasimhan
(1988), Spulber (1995), and Ju, Lin, and Zhu (2006). Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming) provide a
survey of clearinghouse and closely related search-theoretic models which include Stahl (1989), Dana (1994),
Brown and Goolsbee (2002), and Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004).
2documented empirically.4 The second implication of these models is that a ￿rm experiences
a discontinuous ￿jump￿in its demand (which corresponds to clicks in these simple models)
when it o⁄ers the lowest price. Indeed, this discontinuity is a theoretical driver for price
dispersion, yet, to the best of our knowledge, whether such a jump even exists￿ let alone
its economic signi￿cance￿ has never been examined empirically. In terms of the relationship
between clicks and prices, the size of the jump (if any) determines just how ￿key￿it is to
have the lowest price in an online market.
Using a unique dataset from Kelkoo, we estimate the size of the jump and ￿nd it is
economically and statistically signi￿cant. A ￿rm o⁄ering the best price gains 60% more
clicks than if it had not charged the lowest price. In addition, we estimate that a ￿rm￿ s
elasticity of clicks with respect to price (having accounted for the jump) is more elastic
in online markets where competition is keener. We ￿nd that a monopoly seller faces an
elasticity of about ￿2, while in the most competitive markets we analyze (15 sellers), the
elasticity for a representative ￿rm is about ￿6. We are also able to identify the e⁄ect of other
determinants of clicks￿ such as screen location. Our results imply that, other things equal,
a ￿rm receives about 17% fewer clicks for every competitor listed above it on the screen.
Failing to account for the discontinuity in clicks at the lowest price generates signi￿cant
distortions. For example, a ￿rm that competes against the average number of rivals in
our sample and ignores the discontinuity will erroneously conclude that a 10% increase in
its price will reduce its clicks by 44%. In contrast, a ￿rm that correctly accounts for the
discontinuity realizes that a 10% price increase only reduces its clicks by 30% if it is not
currently o⁄ering the lowest price in the market (or if, after the price increase, it remains the
lowest price o⁄ering in the market). However, if the 10% price increase moves the ￿rm out of
the lowest price position in the market, its clicks will decrease by 90%. Thus, ￿rms that do
not take the discontinuity into account will systematically misestimate the impact of a price
change on their clickthrough rates. Likewise, a platform (or ￿nancial analyst) interested in
the impact of a change in the platform￿ s fee structure that raises the prices of all ￿rms by
same percentage will overstate the impact on the platform￿ s clicks by 45%.
4 Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000b) were among the ￿rst to document this phenomenon; see Table 1b in
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming) for a list of nearly 20 di⁄erent studies that document signi￿cant
levels of price dispersion in online markets in the US and abroad.
3Our analysis takes into account some of the unique features of the online marketplace,
including rapid changes in the number of competing ￿rms, the identity of the low-price ￿rm,
and ￿rms￿screen locations. At price comparison sites, the number of ￿rms listing prices for
a given product, and the identity of the ￿rm charging the lowest price, change almost daily.5
Likewise, ￿virtual￿real estate in the online world changes rapidly. In purchasing ￿adwords￿
(advertising space at the side of search queries on Google￿ s site), for instance, retailers realize
the advantage conferred to being the ￿rst listing on the page￿ and bid aggressively to obtain
such a position. At any moment, a retailer can ￿nd itself displaced from this ￿prime￿real
estate to a less favorable screen location. Variation in the identity of the low-priced ￿rm
enables us to disentangle the jump from other determinants of clicks. Variation in the number
of competitors permits us to identify the marginal impact of the number of rivals on a ￿rm￿ s
clicks elasticity. Finally, variation in screen locations allows us to identify the value of the
virtual real estate separately from other ￿rm characteristics.
To the extent one is interested in estimating a ￿rm￿ s demand rather than its number of
clicks, the ideal dataset would include a list of all ￿rms￿prices at the price comparison site,
their number of clicks and ￿nal sales. Unfortunately, the principal-agent problem between
the owners of price-comparison sites and e-retailers means that such data generally do not
exist.6 We show that, under plausible assumptions, one may use the estimates of clicks
elasticities discussed above to place bounds on the actual demand elasticities for products
sold in online markets. Intuitively, if the conversion rate is independent of a ￿rm￿ s price, then
the clicks elasticity exactly corresponds to the demand elasticity. Directional assumptions
about the relationship between conversion rates and underlying variables of interest, such
as a ￿rm￿ s price, allow one to obtain useful bounds on actual demand elasticities using
only clicks data. Viewed in this context, our results also suggest that there are signi￿cant
discontinuities in ￿rms￿demand functions in online markets, and that failing to account for
5 See Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004b) and Ellison and Ellison (2004). Baye and Morgan (2001) show
theoretically that variation in the degree of rivalry of a given online market is essential for ￿rms to avoid
pure Bertrand competition and for the information ￿gatekeeper￿ ￿ the entity running the price comparison
site￿ to pro￿tably operate.
6 We know of only one demand study (Ellison and Ellison, 2004) that is based on actual sales data.
Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) rather ingeniously impute price elasticities for new books at two bookstores
(Amazon and Barnes & Noble) using prices and relative sales rankings obtained directly from the retailers￿
websites.
4this may distort estimates of demand elasticities. Since demand elasticities play a central
role in welfare analysis, we believe that our ￿nding of signi￿cant discontinuities in online
markets is potentially important for Internet-related tax policies.7 In addition to tax policy,
demand elasticities also play an important role in antitrust policy and trade policy.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section describes our data and
provides an overview of the shopping environment at Kelkoo. In Section 3 we present the
theory underlying our estimation methodology, which is based on ￿distribution free￿pseudo-
maximum likelihood count data methods. Section 4 provides estimates of the determinants of
a ￿rm￿ s clicks under the assumption that a ￿rm￿ s number of clicks is a continuous function of
its price. These latter estimates are nested as a special case of the discontinuous speci￿cation,
which is detailed in Section 5. We show that the results discussed above are robust across a
variety of speci￿cations that attempt to account for endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity,
and continuous cross-price e⁄ects. Section 6 o⁄ers conditions under which clicks estimates
may be used to obtain bounds on underlying demand parameters, such as a ￿rm￿ s own- and
cross-price elasticities of demand. In Section 7, we brie￿ y discuss the potential implications
of our results for discrete choice models of individual consumer behavior. Finally, Section
8 discusses the potential rami￿cations of our results for online retailers, platforms, and
policymakers.
2 Data
The proprietary data used in this paper were provided by the UK price comparison site,
Kelkoo.com, which is owned by Yahoo! Within the UK, Kelkoo is the third largest retail
website and attracts over 10 million individual users per month￿ more than twice that of its
closest rival. Over 1,800 individual retailers￿ including 18 of the largest 20 online retailers in
the UK￿ list prices on Kelkoo. According to Yahoo!, Kelkoo is the largest price listing service
in the world, operating in seven other European countries besides the UK. It is recognized
7 For instance, it is well-known that the excess burden of a tax is roughly proportional to the demand
elasticity for the product. Thus, if demand was estimated to be twice as elastic as the true elasticity, then
the evaluation of the excess burden of the tax would be overstated by 100%.
5as one of the six most accessed websites in all of Europe.8
Consumers interested in purchasing a broad range of products access the Kelkoo site to
obtain information about the product and/or to obtain a list of retailers selling the product,
together with the prices charged and other relevant information such as shipping charges.
Consumers interested in making a purchase must do so from the website of the speci￿c
retailer and may easily transfer from the Kelkoo site to a retailer￿ s site by clicking on one of
the links provided.
Kelkoo￿ s revenue is generated by charging retailers a fee for each referral made￿ that is,
each time a consumer transfers from the Kelkoo site to a retailer￿ s site. The fees charged
vary across products and retailers, but typically range from £0.20 to £1.00 per click. Kelkoo
does not charge consumers any fees for using its site.
The products in our dataset consist of 18 of the most popular models of PDAs sold by 19
di⁄erent retailers. These include models by Palm, HP, Sony, and Toshiba and span a wide
range in prices. The lowest priced item is the Palm Handspring Treo, which has a median
price of about £130, while the highest priced item is the Sony Clie nz90, with a median price
of about £537.
Figure 1 shows a typical return from a price search on Kelkoo, which lists twelve retailers
selling the HP iPAQ H5550 PDA. The information displayed includes a brief description of
the product, the names of retailers selling the product, and price information detailed into
item price, shipping charges (￿P&P￿in Kelkoo￿ s terminology) and the total price inclusive
of sales tax (VAT). A consumer interested in purchasing the item may click on the ￿More￿
button, or the retailer￿ s name or logo, to be transferred directly to the retailer￿ s website.
Figure 1 illustrates the heterogeneity in the types of retailers using the site and the wide
range of prices charged for an identical product. Some retailers, such as Comet and PC
World, are ￿bricks-and-clicks￿retailers who have physical stores in addition to an online
presence. Others, such as Amazon and Dell, are well-known pure e-retailers, while ￿rms
such as Big Gray Cat are less well-known specialty e-retailers.
The Kelkoo dataset has certain advantages relative to clicks data from a US price com-
parison site. First, because of di⁄erences in the sales tax rates on interstate versus intrastate
8 Data taken from Hitwise Statistics and company information provided by Kelkoo.
6transactions as well as di⁄erences in tax rates across states, it is di¢ cult to identify the ￿rm
that o⁄ers the lowest price in US data. For instance, a California-based ￿rm o⁄ering the
lowest (pre-tax) price may o⁄er the lowest ￿nal price to a customer domiciled in Indiana
(where sales tax would typically be absent from the transaction) but not to a consumer from
California (where sales tax would be charged). In contrast, the tax component of a ￿rm￿ s
price is identical for all UK consumers shopping at the Kelkoo site regardless of whether
they are domiciled in Scotland, England, or Wales.
Second, unlike many other price comparison sites, the order in which retailers￿prices are
displayed ￿ that is, screen locations￿ are neither auctioned nor sold directly to retailers, and
are independent of the price charged. Consequently, as far as both consumers and retailers
are concerned, the order of price quotations for any speci￿c screen is random. Finally, the
complete list of prices is always displayed on a single page in our data. Thus, a change in a
￿rm￿ s screen location is never associated with a consumer having to click to ￿page two￿in
order to view the listing.
Kelkoo maintains an information log for each ￿referral￿generated at its site.9 The log
registers the retailer name, product name, price information, time of referral, location of the
retailer on the screen and a cookie-speci￿c reference. Kelkoo provided us with information
extracted from their log ￿les for the 18 PDA models for the period from 18 September 2003
to 6 January 2004, a period which generated over 40% of Kelkoo￿ s annual tra¢ c.10
For the 18 PDAs in our sample, this tra¢ c amounted to 39,568 clicks generated by 20,509
separate cookies. The majority (60.1%) of cookies generated only one click, while a small
number of cookies (0.56%) generated more than ten clicks.11 Over the period of our study,
there were 6,151 individual product, retailer and day speci￿c price listings across the 18 PDA
models. Our analysis is based on these observations, along with the number of last clicks
generated for each PDA during the day of each listing.
9 Throughout the paper we use the terms ￿referral￿ , ￿lead￿ , and ￿click￿interchangeably.
10 Kelkoo is bound to protect the anonymity of retailers and consumers in disclosing information about the
referrals they obtain. So in providing the information from their log ￿les, the retailers were identi￿ed in the
dataset by codes, and by some key characteristics, such as whether they had a brick and mortar presence.
11 Following Brynjolfsson, Dick, and Smith (2002), in instances where a consumer￿ s cookie generated
multiple clicks, we use the consumer￿ s last click as an indicator of her ￿nal choice. We also performed the
analysis reported below using all clicks as well as only ￿rst-clicks data, and the results are qualitatively
similar.
7The price used in our analysis is total purchase price￿ the actual cost to a consumer
(including shipping and taxes) of purchasing a speci￿c PDA model. To ensure an ￿apples
to apples￿comparison, we cleaned the data such that our analysis is based on listings of
products that are identical in every respect (including condition). We note that Kelkoo
veri￿es and updates the information it displays daily.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the data. The PDAs in our sample are somewhat
pricey, and shipping accounts for only a small fraction of the total purchase price. The
average total price of a PDA in our sample is £309.04 ($497.55 at exchange rates as of
9/03), of which an average of £4.16 is accounted for by shipping charges. The number
of sellers for a given product on any given day ranges from 1 to 15, with a mean of 4.
The median number of clicks per day for a ￿rm selling a speci￿c PDA in our sample is
2. Consistent with the pattern observed in many traditional retail environments, referrals
occur disproportionately in the fourth quarter of the year. However, as shown in Figure 2,
online shopping disproportionately occurs on weekdays rather than weekends￿ opposite the
pattern observed in many traditional retail environments.
Figure 3 suggests that price and screen location play a potentially important role in
determining the business enjoyed by particular online retailers. Consumers appear to be
very sensitive to price, as is evidenced by the dramatic decline in clicks enjoyed by ￿rms
o⁄ering less favorable prices. Likewise, consumers tend to frequent ￿rms that are listed
above others on the screen. While the screen location and price rank are uncorrelated in our
data, it is possible that the results displayed in Figure 3 are the result of joint correlation
with a third variable.12 We deal with this issue formally in Section 4 of the paper.
3 Estimation Methodology
We now describe our methodology for estimating the factors that determine a ￿rm￿ s number
of clicks at the Kelkoo site.
12 Note that the relationship in Figure 3 does not control for the fact that screens with only n listings
never have price ranks or locations greater than n. Controlling for the number of listings, the weighted
average correlation between price rank and screen location is -0.075 in our data.
83.1 How Firms Obtain Clicks
The number of clicks a ￿rm receives for a given product on a given date depends on many
factors, the most important of which are highlighted in Figure 4. As the ￿gure shows, a
￿rm￿ s clicks depend on the price it charges, the number and prices of rival ￿rms o⁄ering the
same product, the identity of the ￿rm and its rivals, the location of the ￿rm￿ s listing on the
￿page,￿and the date. Formally, let X denote this and other information that consumers
obtain directly from the Kelkoo site. Note that X may include dummy variables to control for
product-speci￿c characteristics (some products are more popular and receive more clicks, on
average, than others), ￿rm characteristics (some ￿rms may have a brick-and-mortar presence
while others do not), and time e⁄ects (￿rms may receive fewer clicks on weekends or products
may exhibit life-cycle e⁄ects that cause clicks to vary systematically over time). Let the




where we use a Lebesque integral to account for the fact that Qi is discrete. The information
in X￿ and this information alone￿ determines the number of clicks a ￿rm obtains from the
Kelkoo site. To estimate the parameters associated with the determinants of a ￿rm￿ s clicks,
we use a pseudo-maximum likelihood approach that does not require us to make speci￿c
assumptions about the underlying distribution generating a ￿rm￿ s number of clicks; instead,
we initially assume the underlying stochastic process has ￿nite mean, given by
E [QijX] = exp[X￿] (2)
In order to estimate the vector of unknown parameters, ￿, one must account for the fact
our clicks data consist of integer numbers of clicks. In fact, as shown in Table 1, over 50% of
the data consist of days in which a ￿rm selling a particular PDA received two or fewer clicks.
For this reason, analysis of these data requires regression techniques suitable for count data.
One approach is to make a speci￿c distributional assumption regarding the underlying
stochastic process (Poisson or negative binomial, for instance), and use standard maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) methods to obtain estimates of the underlying parameters, ￿.
Conditional on the underlying distributional assumption being correct, one obtains consistent
9estimates and standard errors and may perform standard hypothesis tests on ￿. Unfortu-
nately, even if the mean speci￿cation in equation (2) is correct, it is known (see Gourieroux,
et al. (1984a,b); Cameron and Trivedi, 1986) that the resulting maximum likelihood esti-
mates of ￿ and/or the standard errors will be inconsistent if the true stochastic process is
di⁄erent from that used to obtain maximum likelihood estimates.
For this reason, we adopt the pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) approach due to
Gourieroux, et al. (1984a,b) that has received renewed interest due to Cameron and Trivedi
(1998) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001). Roughly, Gourieroux, et al. (1984a) show that so
long as the mean speci￿cation in equation (2) is correct, any estimator for ￿ obtained by
maximizing the likelihood function based on the linear exponential class will be consistent
for ￿ even if the underlying distribution is misspeci￿ed. Since the Poisson distribution is
in the linear exponential class but the negative binomial and other common speci￿cations
used for count data are not (when the parameters of the assumed distribution are unknown),
we use the Poisson-based PML approach to obtain consistent estimates of ￿.13 Following
Hall and Ziedonis (2001), we use robust standard errors to obtain consistent estimates of the
variance-covariance matrix. We also provide MLE estimates based on speci￿c distributional
assumptions, including the negative binomial (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998), as well as
speci￿cations that allow for unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity (using both random and ￿rm
speci￿c e⁄ects, as in Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984). Our results are robust to these
alternative speci￿cations.
4 Continuous Models
In this section we provide estimates of the determinants of a ￿rm￿ s clicks under the assump-
tion that its expected number of clicks is a continuous function of its price.
13 Maximum likelihood methods based on a speci￿c distributional assumption (such as the negative bino-
mial) would lead to more e¢ cient estimates if the speci￿cation of the data generating process is correct, but
inconsistent estimates if the distribution is not correct. Similarly, if one used a discrete choice framework
to estimate behavior at the individual consumer level rather than the ￿rm level, one would likewise obtain
more e¢ cient estimates if the underlying distributional assumption on the random utility component of the
choice generating process were correct.
104.1 Estimates by Product
As a starting point, we pool across ￿rms (i) and dates (t); but estimate separate elasticities
for each of the 18 di⁄erent models of PDAs in our data using the PML procedure described
above. Speci￿cally, we assume
E [QijtjXijt] = exp
￿
￿j lnpijt + ￿jX1;ijt
￿
; (3)
where Qijt is the number clicks ￿rm i received on product j at time t, pijt is the total price
(including VAT and shipping) ￿rm i charged for product j at time t, and X1;ijt is a vector
of controls. Notice that ￿j may be interpreted as the own price elasticity of clicks for a
representative seller of a model j PDA. The vector X1;ijt consists of the following controls:
Position on Screen. As we showed earlier in Figure 3, when a ￿rm￿ s price is listed
above its rivals, it tends to receive more clicks. Clicks tend to decrease as the position on
the screen gets lower. Hence, we include a linear position on screen variable to capture this
e⁄ect.14
Weekend. As displayed in Figure 2, ￿rms systematically receive fewer clicks on weekends.
Hence, we include a weekend dummy variable to control for this e⁄ect on clicks.
Month. We include month dummies to control for seasonal e⁄ects on clicks.
Table 2 reports the results of the individual product regressions. Notice that 13 of the
estimated own price elasticities in Table 2 are statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero
at the 1% level, with values ranging from ￿1.75 (for the Toshiba E770) to ￿14.691 (for the
HP Compaq iPAQ 1940). These estimates vary widely across PDAs. In interpreting these
results, and to better understand the widely di⁄erent estimates obtained for di⁄erent models
of PDAs, it is important to recognize that these estimates are ￿rm clicks elasticities ￿ not
market clicks elasticities. One of the key theoretical determinants of a ￿rm￿ s price elasticity
of demand is the availability of substitutes￿ the more sellers o⁄ering the same product, the
more elastic is the demand facing a ￿rm selling that product. For instance, it is well-known
that in a symmetric n-￿rm capacity-constrained price-setting environment, the elasticity of
demand facing an individual ￿rm (EF) is n times the market elasticity (EM): EF = nEM.
14 We investigated nonlinear speci￿cations of screen location as well and obtained similar results to those
reported here. We chose the linear speci￿cation for parsimony.
11One might expect clicks behavior to have a similar property.15 If this is the case and di⁄erent
numbers of ￿rms sold di⁄erent types of PDAs, ￿rms￿clicks elasticities would vary widely
across PDA models even if the market elasticity of clicks were the same for each model of
PDA.
Thus, it seems useful to investigate the relationship between the clicks elasticity estimates
reported in Table 2 and the average number of ￿rms selling each PDA. This relationship is
plotted in Figure 5. The estimates are divided into those that are not statistically signi￿cant
at conventional levels (shown as open circles) and those that are signi￿cant at the 1% level
(shown as ￿lled-in diamonds). As Figure 5 shows, there is a strong negative relationship
between the elasticity estimates for each of the products and the average number of ￿rms
o⁄ering price quotes for the product. This suggests the need to control for the number of
sellers were one to pool across all products.
4.2 Pooled Estimates
We now report estimates obtained by pooling across ￿rms (i), dates (t); and di⁄erent models
of PDAs using the PML procedure. Here we consider two models: a baseline model that
does not allow elasticities to vary with the number of sellers, and a more general model that
takes into account our preliminary ￿ndings in the individual product speci￿cations. The
baseline model assumes
E [QijtjXijt] = exp[￿ lnpijt + ￿X1;ijt]: (4)
The controls for this speci￿cation include all of those in equation (3) as well as following:
Product. As the previous speci￿cation revealed, there are di⁄erences in clicks for each
of the di⁄erent PDA models. For instance, PDAs di⁄er from one another in terms of their
popularity, their operating system, various performance characteristics, add-on software, and
so on. Thus we include product dummies for each of the 18 PDA models.
Product-Month Interactions. In addition, the popularity of a PDA varies depending
on new entrants in the PDA product space. As technology and performance improve with
15 For instance, if a ￿rm￿ s demand were proportional to clicks, a ￿rm￿ s clicks elasticity would correspond
to its demand elasticity and thus be a function of the number of sellers in the market.
12the introduction of new models, the popularity of an existing PDA can decline￿ sometimes
dramatically. To control for these e⁄ects, we include dummies interacting each of the product
dummies with the month dummies mentioned above. This, in principle, allows PDA ￿life
cycles￿to di⁄er during the time horizon of our study.
Bricks and Clicks Retailer. Some of the ￿rms in our dataset have an established
physical presence in addition to their online presence. Clearly, the reputation as well as the
ease of returns and accumulated brand equity of these retailers may di⁄er from pure online
sellers. Thus, we include a dummy variable for whether a particular ￿rm is a bricks and
clicks retailer.
With these controls in place, we report PML estimates (Table 3, Model 1) based on
the mean speci￿cation in equation (4). The bottom of Table 3 also reports the results of
a likelihood ratio test for overdispersion of the negative binomial (2) type (cf. Cameron
and Trivedi, 1990). This is a test of the null hypothesis that the mean and variance of the
click generating process are equal, as would be the case were the data generating process
truly coming from a Poisson distribution. As the table shows, we overwhelmingly reject
this hypothesis, indicating that the underlying distribution is not Poisson. As discussed
above, the parameter estimates are nonetheless consistent (provided the mean speci￿cation
in equation (4) is correct), but the overdispersion test indicates that Poisson-based maximum
likelihood estimates of their standard errors are not consistent. To obtain consistent variance-
covariance estimates, we employ the standard error correction techniques of Rogers (1993),
Huber (1967) and White (1980,1982).16 The corresponding z-statistics are reported in Table
3.17
The results show a price elasticity of clicks of ￿4.61, which is fairly close to the average
over the individual product elasticities reported in Table 2. More favorable screen positions
lead to increased clicks: All else equal, a ￿rm that moves up one screen position enjoys an
18.6% increase in clicks. These results con￿rm what we saw earlier in Figure 3: There is
16 Speci￿cally, we use the grouping technique of Rogers (1993) to relax the independence of observations
for a given ￿rm i across products and time. This allows potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in
the errors.
17 Some researchers have taken the view that the rejection of the null hypothesis of no overdispersion
warrants the use of a negative binomial speci￿cation. For this reason, we report ML estimates based on
the negative binomial (2) speci￿cation in Table A1. As that table shows, the parameter estimates are very
similar.
13a strong tendency for consumers to click on ￿rms listed at the top of the display screen,
all else equal. This may also explain why search engines that auction screen positions,
such as Google, receive signi￿cant premia for positions located near the top of the screen.
Interestingly, while the coe¢ cient associated with being a bricks and clicks retailer has the
expected positive sign (0.262), it is not signi￿cant at conventional levels in this continuous
speci￿cation.
To account for a potential relationship between a ￿rm￿ s clicks elasticity and the number
of competing sellers in the pooled model, we generalize equation (4) to allow individual ￿rm
elasticities to depend on the number of sellers as follows:
E [QijtjXijt] = exp[(￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1)lnpijt + ￿2njt + ￿X1;ijt]; (5)
where njt denotes the number of sellers of type j PDA on date t. Notice that, in this
speci￿cation, the clicks elasticity for a representative ￿rm is given by
￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1:
Thus, the coe¢ cient of total price (￿0) represents the clicks elasticity for a monopoly seller,
￿0 +￿1 represents the elasticity in duopoly PDA markets, and more generally, ￿1 represents
the impact on a ￿rm￿ s clicks elasticity of facing an additional competitor. In addition to our
earlier controls, we include the following:
The Number of Sellers. Besides the theoretical rationale for permitting a representa-
tive ￿rm￿ s clicks elasticity to depend on the number of sellers, one might expect the number
of clicks received by a particular ￿rm to directly depend on the number of sellers. For a given
consumer base, adding additional sellers would tend to reduce the expected number of clicks
enjoyed by any particular ￿rm. In addition, one might speculate that consumers are more
likely to click and purchase PDAs that are sold by more ￿rms, as additional ￿rms might
stimulate online sales by making the market appear more credible in the eyes of consumers.
As we will see below, our framework permits one to disentangle these two competing e⁄ects.
We include a linear term for the number of sellers.18
The resulting estimates are displayed in the Model 2 column of Table 3. As the table
shows, the number of sellers has a signi￿cant e⁄ect￿ both in terms of levels as well as on
18 We also ran dummy speci￿cations for the number of sellers and obtained similar results.
14clicks elasticities. Controlling for the number of ￿rms listing prices, we ￿nd that the price
elasticity of clicks for a monopoly seller is ￿3.761, which implies that a 10% increase in price
leads to a 38% decline in clicks. Adding a second ￿rm to the market raises the elasticity to
around ￿4.049. When ten ￿rms list prices, the estimated elasticity becomes ￿6.64, which
implies that a 10% increase in price results in a 66% decline in a ￿rm￿ s number of clicks.
What is the impact of a change in the number of sellers on a ￿rm￿ s overall number of
clicks? As we mentioned above, there is a direct e⁄ect as well as an indirect e⁄ect from
increased competitiveness. Taking the derivative of equation (5) and evaluating it at the
mean of our data yields
@ lnE [QijtjX]
@njt
j￿ pijt = ^ ￿1 ln ￿ pijt + ^ ￿2
= ￿:288 ￿ 5:67 + 1:593;
or about ￿0:04 (p = :0155). It is useful to contrast the magnitude of this ￿rivalry￿e⁄ect
with that of a change in a ￿rm￿ s screen position. As Table 3 shows, a reduction of one screen
position decreases the ￿rm￿ s clicks 17.5%. Thus, our estimates suggest that the impact of
screen position is more than four times larger than the impact of an additional competitor
appearing on the price comparison site.
4.3 Potential Misspeci￿cation
One may have a number of concerns regarding the estimates based on the continuous clicks
speci￿cation in equation (5). As we have emphasized, the PML approach is robust against
alternative distributional assumptions but not to the misspeci￿cation of the underlying mean
of the stochastic process.
First and foremost, price comparison sites are often used by consumers looking to obtain a
given product at the best price. For instance, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) have provided
evidence that 49% of consumers using price comparison sites in the U.S. make purchase
decisions based purely on price. The results of Ghose, et al. (2006) seem to indicate a jump
in a ￿rm￿ s demand when it sets the lowest price. Moreover, recall that in our data (see
Figure 3), 45% of the clicks are at the lowest price. These observations, coupled with the
recent literature discussed in the introduction that rationalizes the observed levels of price
15dispersion in online markets suggests that a ￿rm lowering its price from the second-lowest
to the lowest price enjoys a discontinuous jump in its number of clicks.
To see the potential rami￿cations of a discontinuity at the lowest price (as implied by
clearinghouse models) on clicks estimation, suppose there is a unit mass of consumers, half
of which are ￿shoppers￿who click on the ￿rm o⁄ering the lowest price and the other half
are ￿loyals￿ who have a preference for a particular seller. Consumers within each group
have identical and constant clicks elasticities, ￿; thus, a ￿rm￿ s number of clicks is given by
Q = p￿￿. A ￿rm that charges the lowest price in the market enjoys clicks from both groups,
while a ￿rm charging a price above the minimum price in the market only receives clicks
from its loyal customers. Figure 6 illustrates the rami￿cations on clicks estimation. The
slope of the two steep lines through the data are the same, and represent the true clicks
elasticity, ￿￿, for prices above or below the minimum price. At the minimum price, there is
a discontinuous jump in clicks owing to the fact that the ￿rm attracts all of the shoppers at
this price.
The dashed line through the data represents the elasticity estimate that results from
failing to take into account the discontinuous jump that occurs when the ￿rm charges the
lowest price. Notice that, by ignoring the jump in clicks at the lowest price, one obtains an
elasticity estimate that overstates how responsive consumers are to a change in price.
In addition to the potential problem caused by using a continuous speci￿cation in the
presence of ￿shoppers,￿two additional econometric issues are potentially relevant. First,
while there are sound theoretical reasons for elasticities (and per-￿rm clicks) to depend on
the number of ￿rms listing prices, the estimates may be biased due to potential endogeneity.
In particular, popular products are likely to (for a given number of ￿rms) result in a ￿rm
receiving more clicks, and this may encourage additional ￿rms to enter the market.
Second, while we have controlled for one ￿rm characteristic￿ whether a ￿rm is a bricks
and clicks retailer￿ a variety of unobserved ￿rm characteristics, such as the degree of ac-
cumulated brand equity or di⁄erences in consumers￿perceptions of ￿rm quality, could also
potentially bias our results. Thus, it may be important to account for unobserved ￿rm
characteristics in estimating a ￿rm￿ s clicks.
We address these and other issues in the next section.
165 Discontinuous Models
Clearinghouse models (e.g., the seminal models of Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980))
postulate that ￿rms compete for two types of consumers: price-sensitive shoppers (who
always purchase at the lowest price) and loyals (who do not). In this section we use these
models to derive functional forms that allow for a possible jump in a ￿rm￿ s clicks when
it charges the lowest price. We then describe the estimating equation and report results.
Finally, we examine issues associated with endogeneity, unobserved ￿rm characteristics, and
potential continuous cross-price e⁄ects.
5.1 Theory and Estimation Strategy
Suppose that njt ￿rms numbered i = 1;2;:::;njt sell product j at a price comparison site on
date t. Let pijt denote the total price of ￿rm i in this market. A ￿rm in this market competes
for two types of consumers: Loyals, who click on their preferred ￿rm, and shoppers, who click
on the ￿rm charging the lowest price. Because of the extreme price sensitivity of shoppers,
it is useful to de￿ne the set of ￿rms o⁄ering the ￿best￿(lowest) price for product j at time
t as:
Bjt = fi : pijt ￿ pkjt for all k 6= ig:
Let QS
ijt and QL
ijt denote the number of product j clicks that ￿rm i obtains from shoppers
and loyals, respectively, when charging the price pijt: Recall that ￿rm i obtains clicks from
shoppers only if it is in the set Bjt; that is, if it o⁄ers one of the best prices. Thus, the








ijt if i 2 Bjt
QL
ijt if i = 2 Bjt
Thus, ￿rm i faces a jump in clicks for product j when it is among those ￿rms o⁄ering the
best price for product j on date t.
To account for the discontinuity in clicks when the ￿rm o⁄ers one of the best prices in the
market, let Ijt be an indicator function that equals unity when i 2 Bjt and zero otherwise,
and let #Bjt denote the number of ￿rms o⁄ering the best price for product j at time t:














ijt (X) and ￿S
ijt (X) represent the non-price determinants of clicks (such as screen
location) on loyals and shoppers, respectively. To ease the notational burden, we suppress












































ijt ￿ ￿jt lnpijt (6)
Estimation requires imposing additional structure on the parameters in equation (6). We
assume
￿jt = ￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1 (7)
As in the previous section, this parsimonious speci￿cation allows a ￿rm￿ s clicks elasticity for
product j to depend on the number of sellers at time t: In addition, we allow di⁄erent ￿rms
to have di⁄erent numbers of loyals and shoppers, and also permit the number of each to vary
over time and across products. However, we assume
￿
S




ijt (Xijt) = a
L￿ijt (Xijt)
so that the ratio of these two expressions is constant. In particular, this assumption implies
￿ijt = ￿ =
aS
aL: (8)
Under these assumptions, the mean speci￿cation is:
E [QijtjX] = exp
￿






18where X1;jt is the matrix of controls discussed earlier (position on screen, bricks and clicks
retailer, weekend, month, and product dummies as well as product-month interaction dum-
mies). As above, we may interpret the expression ￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1 as the price elasticity of
clicks for a ￿rm that faces njt ￿ 1 rivals. Similarly, we may interpret ￿ as the jump from
shoppers; that is, the size of the discontinuous jump in clicks that a ￿rm enjoys when it o⁄ers
the ￿best￿price. Notice that the continuous model is nested in the speci￿cation of equation
(9) when ￿ = 0; thus, we may readily test the null hypothesis implied by the continuous
clicks speci￿cation.
5.2 Parameter Estimates
Model 1 in Table 4 reports PML estimates of the parameters in equation (9). Recall that
under the nested continuous clicks speci￿cation, the coe¢ cient associated with the jump from
shoppers (￿) is equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis, predicted from the clearinghouse
models, is that this coe¢ cient should be positive. The coe¢ cient estimate for this e⁄ect is
0.603. Moreover, we can reject the null hypothesis of the continuous model in favor of the
(one-sided) alternative discontinuous speci￿cation at the 1% signi￿cance level. In short, we
￿nd considerable evidence for a jump in clicks when a ￿rm o⁄ers the lowest price.
Figure 6 suggested that, in the presence of such a jump, estimates based on the continuous
speci￿cation imply a greater sensitivity of a ￿rm￿ s clicks to its price than in the discontinuous
speci￿cation. The results shown in Model 1 of Table 4 compared to those in Model 2 of
Table 3 are consistent with this observation. Accounting for the discontinuity in clicks, the
estimated elasticity for a monopoly seller becomes less elastic￿ going from ￿3:761 (in Model
2 of Table 3) to ￿2.459 (in Model 1 of Table 4). The di⁄erence in the elasticity estimates is
greater for markets with more than one seller: The e⁄ect of an additional rival on the clicks
elasticity is reduced by around 12.5% (from ￿0:288 in Model 2 of Table 3 to ￿0:252 in Model
1 of Table 4). We also note that, in contrast to the continuous speci￿cation, the e⁄ect of a
change in the number of ￿rms on a ￿rm￿ s overall number of clicks
￿
@ lnE [QijtjX]=@njtj￿ pijt
￿
is not statistically di⁄erent from zero (p = :4674).
It is of some interest to note the economic relevance of our estimate of the jump from
shoppers (￿ = 0:603). Other things equal, a ￿rm that sets the lowest price in the market
19enjoys a 60.3% increase in clicks. In contrast, notice that the ￿position on screen￿coe¢ cient
implies that a ￿rm would have to move up 3 screen positions to generate the same increase
in clicks that results from setting the lowest price in the market. Also, note that setting the
lowest price in the market entails a jump in clicks that is about twice as large as the 32.1%
shift associated with being a bricks and clicks retailer.
One may use our estimates of ￿ to obtain a very crude estimate of the fraction of con-
sumers using the Kelkoo site who are shoppers. The total number of clicks for product j on














































































































20which implies (given the estimate of ￿ = :603 reported in Model 1 of Table 4 and the mean
number of listings (4:05) in our data) that about 13% of consumers at Kelkoo are shoppers.
While the symmetry assumptions used to calculate this crude estimate are at odds with the
data (among other things, the estimates suggest that bricks-and-clicks sellers receive 32.1%
more clicks than pure online sellers), it nonetheless illustrates that even in an online market
where 87% of the consumers are ￿loyal￿to a particular ￿rm, discontinuities arising from
shoppers can signi￿cantly impact estimates of a ￿rm￿ s clicks elasticity.
5.3 Potential Misspeci￿cation
While the PML approach used to obtain the estimates reported above does not make speci￿c
distributional assumptions about the underlying clicks generating process (apart from as-
suming that the conditional mean speci￿cation is correct), it is nonetheless useful to compare
the shape of the empirical distribution with the distribution based on the number of clicks
predicted by the model. As Figure 7 reveals, the distribution of predicted clicks (based on
Model 1 in Table 4) resembles that observed in the data. While this is somewhat reassuring,
it does not rule out the possibility that Model 1 in Table 4 is misspeci￿ed due to endogene-
ity, unobserved heterogeneity across ￿rms, or the failure to incorporate additional cross price
e⁄ects.
Endogeneity
One concern that might be raised with the preceding analysis is that two of the key
variables of interest￿ price and the number of listing ￿rms￿ might be endogenous in the sense
that the regressors may be correlated with omitted variables, thus creating the possibility
of inconsistent parameter estimates. This problem might arise through unobserved factors
that in￿ uence clicks, such as variations in a product￿ s popularity. In addition, changes in
popularity would also be correlated with the number of sellers (an increase in popularity
would presumably induce more sellers to enter) as well as the prices charged for the product
(￿rms would raise prices for ￿hot￿products and reduce them for ￿cold￿products).
To be concrete, suppose that the correct clicks generating process is given by:
Qijt = exp
￿
(￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1)lnpijt + ￿2njt + ￿
Ijt
#Bjt
+ ￿X1;ijt + popjt
￿
+ "ijt (10)
21where popjt denotes an unobserved latent variable and "ijt is a zero mean error term. Then,
the correct conditional mean speci￿cation is:
E [QijtjXijt;popjt] = exp
￿
(￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1)lnpijt + ￿2njt + ￿
Ijt
#Bjt
+ ￿X1;ijt + popjt
￿
and hence equation (9) is misspeci￿ed. However, the parameter estimates based on equation
(9) remain consistent provided:
E [QijtjXijt;popjt] = E [QijtjXijt] (11)
That is, to the extent that ￿ uctuations in popjt only occur inter-month, any in￿ uence of popjt
on E [QijtjXijt;popjt] will be absorbed in the product-time interaction dummies contained
in X1;ijt; and equation (11) will hold￿ the mean speci￿cation given in equation (9) will
be correct. If there is intra-month variation in popjt, however, this variation will not be
absorbed in the product-time interaction dummies. Furthermore, for the reasons described
above, popjt is likely to be correlated with pijt and njt. In this case, equation (11) will not
hold, and the parameter estimates reported above will be inconsistent.
To deal with this potential endogeneity problem, we collected additional data from the
US to serve as a proxy for unobserved factors that in￿ uence clicks in the UK (i.e. the variable
popjt). In particular, for each of the PDAs in our UK sample and for each date, we obtained
data on that PDA￿ s product popularity ranking (for that same day) from Shopper.com￿ a
US price comparison site.19 The product popularity ranking are integers (1 represents the
most popular product, 2 the second most popular product, and so on), and are constructed
by Shopper.com based on consumer pageviews at its site. It seems plausible that the product
popularity ranking of an identical PDA model in the US on a given date is a valid proxy
for its popularity in the UK for that same date, as it is likely correlated with popjt but






jt is a matrix of dummy variables for the popularity of product j at time t from
the US data, ￿ is a vector of parameters associated with each product rank, and ￿jt is an
19 The US data is discussed in more detail in Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004a).
22error term. Substituting this relation into equation (10); one obtains
Qijt = exp
￿
(￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1)lnpijt + ￿2njt + ￿
Ijt
#Bjt





Assuming ￿jt is independent of the other regressors, this implies a conditional mean speci￿-
cation of
E [QijtjXijt;popjt] = exp
￿
(￿0 + (njt ￿ 1)￿1)lnpijt + ￿2njt + ￿
Ijt
#Bjt





where we have assumed, without loss of generality, that E [exp[￿jt]] = 1.
Under the stated assumptions, PML estimation of equation (12) gives consistent parame-
ter estimates. We report the results of this speci￿cation as Model 2 in Table 4. As the table
shows, controlling for potential endogeneity does little to the magnitude or the signi￿cance
of the coe¢ cient estimates.20
Unobserved Firm Heterogeneity
Another potential shortcoming of the PML approach used in Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 is
that the speci￿cation presumes there is no unobserved heterogeneity across ￿rms. While we
have attempted to control for di⁄erences across ￿rms that stem from their having di⁄erent
online and o› ine presences, as well as di⁄erent screen locations, it is still possible that a
particular ￿rm￿ s clicks are also driven by unobserved factors. For this reason, we also report
in Table 4 results that allow for the e⁄ects of unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity.
Model 3 in Table 4 reports maximum likelihood estimates of the discontinuous model
based on the random e⁄ects speci￿cation for unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity pioneered by
Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984), while Model 4 reports conditional maximum likelihood
estimates based on a ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation for unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity. Note that
these results require the speci￿cation of the actual likelihood function, which we have take
to be Poisson. However, Table A2 in the appendix shows that the results reported in Table
4 and discussed below are similar if one uses the likelihood function for a negative binomial
(2) speci￿cation.
20 There is some evidence that the US popularity dummies address the endogeneity issues discussed above.
In all speci￿cations that include US popularity dummies, we reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients
on DUSPOP
jt are jointly equal to zero (p < 0:001).
23Notice that, in both the random e⁄ects (Model 3) and ￿xed e⁄ects (Model 4) speci￿ca-
tions, the coe¢ cients of interest are roughly comparable to those obtained ignoring potential
unobserved heterogeneity (Models 1 and 2). As the coe¢ cient on the jump from shoppers
reveals, we still reject the null hypothesis of the continuous model in favor of the discontinu-
ous speci￿cation. Further, the economic value of the coe¢ cient associated with the jump is
largely unchanged by allowing for potential unobserved heterogeneity. Likewise, the coe¢ -
cient associated with the clicks elasticity for a monopoly ￿rm remains at about ￿2:5; similar
to the estimate obtained in Model 1.
In contrast, both the e⁄ect of a change in the number of rivals on a ￿rm￿ s clicks elas-
ticity as well as the e⁄ect of change in screen position on a ￿rm￿ s clicks are dampened in
Models 3 and 4 compared to Model 1. This suggests that part of the e⁄ect that was pre-
viously attributed to changes in screen position or rivalry is more properly accounted for
by unobserved ￿rm heterogeneities. Nonetheless, the coe¢ cients on these variables remain
economically and statistically signi￿cant.
Continuous Cross-Price E⁄ects
A ￿nal potential concern with the clicks estimates presented above is that, although the
discontinuous speci￿cation is consistent with theoretical clearinghouse models, it does not
allow for cross-price e⁄ects (except for the discontinuous jump in clicks a ￿rm enjoys when
the minimum rival￿ s price rises above its price). One might conjecture that our relatively
inelastic estimates of clicks elasticities, as well as the signi￿cant discontinuity in clicks (jump
from shoppers) stem from misspeci￿cation ￿that is, a failure to allow for continuous cross-
price e⁄ects.
To investigate this alternative hypothesis, we generalized the speci￿cations to allow for
continuous cross-price e⁄ects by including the logarithm of the geometric average of rivals￿
prices on a given product-date as a regressor.21 In this speci￿cation, the estimated coe¢ cient
for the logarithm of the geometric mean of rival￿ s prices represents a ￿rm￿ s cross price
elasticity of clicks with respect to the (geometric) average of rivals prices.
The results are displayed in Table 5, and reveal that the ￿ndings discussed above are
21 Since cross-price e⁄ects are only relevant for product-dates in which two or more ￿rms compete, for
product dates in which only a single ￿rm listed a price, we coded the logarithm of the geometric average of
rivals￿prices as zero and included a dummy that equaled one for these events and zero otherwise.
24robust to the inclusion of continuous cross-price e⁄ects. For the continuous speci￿cation
(Model 1), the cross-price e⁄ects are not statistically di⁄erent from zero at conventional
levels (even after controlling for potential endogeneity, as both speci￿cations in Table 5 do).
For the discontinuous speci￿cation (Model 2), note that although the coe¢ cient for the
cross price elasticity of clicks is positive, it is relatively small (0.38) and not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero at conventional levels.22 More importantly, our ￿nding that a ￿rm enjoys
a signi￿cant 60% jump in clicks when it succeeds in o⁄ering the lowest price is robust to the
inclusion of continuous cross-price e⁄ects.
6 Implications for Firm Demand
In this section, we o⁄er conditions under which the above parameter estimates may be used
to recover or place bounds on the elasticities of demand facing individual ￿rms operating in
the Kelkoo marketplace.
Toward this end, recall the process by which a click leads to a sale shown in Figure
4. After having observed information X at the Kelkoo site, consumers clicking through
to a ￿rm￿ s site receive additional information (denoted Zi) that in￿ uences their decision
to purchase. This information might include the ￿rm￿ s attempt at obfuscation along the
lines described by Ellison and Ellison (2004), the visual attractiveness and usability of the
￿rm￿ s site, whether the ￿rm is o⁄ering any guarantees on the product over and above those
provided by the manufacturer, the exact restocking and return policies of the ￿rm, and
so on. Of course, consumers￿perceptions of these factors may be colored by the previous
information, X; obtained on the Kelkoo site. To account for the possibility that consumers
may observe Zi￿ s for all ￿rms before making purchase decisions, let Z = (Z1;Z2:::Zn) denote
the vector of all such information. In this case, the probability that a click on ￿rm i is
converted into a sale, given (Z;X); is
Pr(saleijZ;X) = Gi (Z;X)
22 Note, however, that one can reject the joint hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of absence of rivals dummy
and log geometric mean of rival￿ s prices are zero at the 10 percent level in Model 1 and the 1 percent level
in Model 2.
25Using equation (2), we may write the expected demand for a given product sold by ￿rm i,
conditional on (X;Z), as
E [DijX;Z] = Gi (Z;X) ￿ E [QijX]
= Gi (Z;X) ￿ exp[X￿]
The multiplicative separability of the probability of conversion, Gi; and the clicks generating
process follows naturally from the Kelkoo search and buying environment. Of central interest
is the e⁄ect of information obtained from the Kelkoo site (various components of X) on ￿nal
demand. Suppose one wished to measure the e⁄ect on ￿rm i￿ s demand of a change in xi
(some component of i￿ s information posted at Kelkoo). It is useful to rewrite X = (xi;X1)
where X1 represents all components of X other than xi: If xi in￿ uences ￿rm i￿ s clicks but
does not impact its conversion rate for that product, one may recover the ￿rm￿ s elasticity of
demand with respect to xi from its elasticity of clicks: Formally,
Proposition 1 Suppose that Gi (Z;(xi;X1)) = Gi (Z;(x0
i;X1)) for all xi;x0
i: Then















Proof. We ￿rst prove the result for the di⁄erentiable case. Recall that log expected demand
is given by
lnE [DijX;Z] = lnGi (Z;X) + lnE [QijX]









and since Gi (Z;(xi;X1)) = Gi (Z;(x0
i;X1)) for all xi;x0
i;
@ lnGi(Z;X)







26Next, we prove the result for the non-di⁄erentiable case.
%￿E [Dij(xi;X1);Z] =





E [Qijxi;X1] ￿ E [Qijx0
i;X1]
E [Qijxi;X1]
where we have again used the fact that Gi (Z;(xi;X1)) = Gi (Z;(x0
i;X1)) for all xi;x0
i:
Notice that the conditions of the Proposition allows ￿rm i￿ s conversion rate for product j
to depend on additional information obtained from all ￿rms￿individual websites (Z), as well
as all the other information posted at the Kelkoo site (X1)￿ including information other
than xi posted by ￿rm i: Provided that ￿rm i￿ s conversion rate is insensitive to xi￿ that
is, conditional on (xi;X1) being su¢ ciently ￿favorable￿ to induce the consumer to click
through to ￿rm i￿ s site ￿rst place, the level of xi does not in￿ uence the likelihood that the
clickthrough is converted into a sale￿ the Proposition shows how to recover the associated
demand parameter from clicks estimates.
The proposition has several potentially useful implications. First, when xi is ￿rm i￿ s price
listed on the Kelkoo site, and the conversion rate is independent of ￿rm i￿ s price, then one
may interpret a ￿rm￿ s elasticity of ￿clicks￿with respect to price as its own price elasticity
of demand. Second, when xi is a discrete variable (such as a dummy variable), one may use
estimates based on clicks data to infer the percentage impact of a discrete change in xi on a
￿rm￿ s demand.
More importantly, one may use clicks estimates to obtain bounds for underlying demand
parameters. For instance, if ￿rm i￿ s conversion rate is increasing in xi, then the estimated







@ lnxi ). Consequently, the clicks elasticity of ￿2:091
reported in Model 2 of Table 5 implies that a 10% increase in a monopoly seller￿ s price
reduces its quantity demanded by at least 20:91% if conversion rates are non-increasing in
price. Similarly, our estimates imply that bricks and clicks retailers enjoy at least 32.6%
higher sales than their purely online competitors if conversion rates for these ￿rms are at
least as high as their purely online rivals.
277 Implications for Discrete Choice Models of Individ-
ual Behavior
Our analysis has focused on the determinants of the total numbers of clicks that ￿rms receive
in an online marketplace, treating the ￿rm as the unit of observation. One possible worry
concerns the relationship between the speci￿cation of clicks at the ￿rm level, given in equation
(12); and underlying individual behavior. However, we showed that this speci￿cation arises
when one aggregates individual behavior as it is speci￿ed in standard clearinghouse models:
Exogenous di⁄erences in preferences induce some consumers to only click the low-price ￿rm
and others to click their preferred ￿rm. These models predict that there exists a jump in a
￿rm￿ s clicks (stemming from the choice behavior of shoppers) when it charges the lowest price
in the market. As documented above and in the Appendix, there is considerable evidence
that this jump is economically and statistically signi￿cant. Moreover, failing to account for
the jump distorts the estimates of the parameters associated with the determinants of a
￿rm￿ s total number of clicks.
To the extent that one is interested in a more detailed analysis of individual consumer
choice rather than the total number of clicks that a ￿rm (or platform) receives, discrete
choice models of individual behavior (such as the multinomial logit family of models) are
appropriate alternatives. Standard versions of these models postulate that each consumer
has the same propensity to click on a particular ￿rm, given that ￿rm￿ s characteristics and
the characteristics of the other ￿rms in the choice set. Variation in choices across consumers
is assumed to arise from a random utility component, which is typically assumed to be iid
across consumers. Our results suggest that it might be appropriate to account for jumps when
estimating click propensities at the individual consumer level. In particular, a ￿shopper￿ s￿
propensity to click a given ￿rm critically depends on whether it o⁄ers the lowest price, while
a ￿loyal￿ s￿propensity does not. Given appropriate assumptions on the structure of loyal and
shopper behavior, one could, in principle, use a discrete choice framework to obtain estimates
of the determinants of individual consumer￿ s propensities to click on a particular ￿rm. Our
results based on analysis at the ￿rm-level suggest that accounting for such asymmetries in
individual choice is a potentially fruitful avenue for future research.
288 Discussion
Standard models of online price competition predict a discontinuous jump in a ￿rm￿ s clicks
when it succeeds in charging the lowest price in the market. These models also predict
that the responsiveness of a ￿rm￿ s clicks to a change in its price depends on the number of
rivals. Our results indicate that both the number of competing sellers and the ￿rm￿ s rank
in the list of prices are important determinants of an online retailer￿ s clicks. We ￿nd that
an online monopolist faces a clicks elasticity of about ￿2, while sellers competing against
10 other sellers face an elasticity of about ￿6. We also ￿nd empirical evidence of a 60%
jump in a ￿rm￿ s clicks as its price declines from the second-lowest to the lowest price. We
conclude by illustrating the potential relevance of our ￿ndings for stakeholders in online
markets, including ￿rms that advertise prices at comparison sites, the sites themselves, and
policymakers.
Consider the low-priced ￿rm in a market with one other rival that is contemplating a price
increase. Based on the estimates in Model 1 of Table 5, if the ￿rm ignored the discontinuity
in clicks it would conclude that a 10% price increase would reduce clicks by 37%. A ￿rm
that properly accounted for the jump would recognize that the impact of a price increase
critically depends on whether it remained the low priced ￿rm. If the ￿rm can increase its
price by 10% and retain low-priced status, Model 2 of Table 5 indicates that its clicks would
decline by only 24%. However, if the 10% price increase moves the ￿rm out of the low-price
position, the ￿rm￿ s clicks would decline by 85%. Regardless of whether conversion rates are
independent of the ￿rm￿ s price, this translates into a discrepancy in the ￿rm￿ s estimated
clicks (and clickthrough fees) of 13% to 48%.
Next, consider the situation from the viewpoint of Yahoo￿ s price comparison site. Suppose
Yahoo correctly forecasts that a 3% increase in its clickthrough fees would lead to a 1%
increase in the prices charged by each ￿rm in a duopoly market. If the platform used Model
1 of Table 5 to estimate the clicks elasticity, it would erroneously conclude that the 3%
increase in clickthrough fees would reduce its clicks by 3.7%￿ an unpro￿table move. On the
other hand, if it used Model 2 in Table 5, the comparison site would (correctly) conclude that
the 3% increase in clickthrough fees would reduce clicks by only 2.4%￿ a pro￿table move.
29Finally, consider a policymaker contemplating the imposition of a national ad valorem
tax on Internet transactions that would increase each ￿rm￿ s price by a factor of 1 + ￿. The
policy-maker￿ s ￿rst-order approximation of the excess burden of the tax paid by a consumer






where pk and qk are the initial price and quantity data for this particular consumer and ￿ is
the own-price elasticity of demand. Our results suggest that, since the elasticity estimates
under the continuous speci￿cations are signi￿cantly more elastic than in the discontinuous
speci￿cations, the failure to account for discontinuities leads to potential biases in the welfare
analysis of such a tax. For example, if the policymaker￿ s estimate of the elasticity of demand
were based on the continuous speci￿cation in Model 1 of Table 5 and a duopoly market, the










In other words, failure to account for discontinuities in estimation and policy analysis could
lead to excess burden calculations that are 54% higher than that actually experienced by
any individual consumer in the market (shopper or loyal). While a proper analysis of taxes
and Internet transactions obviously requires more detailed analysis, this simple calculation
illustrates that failing to account for discontinuities in online data may lead to signi￿cant
biases in policy analysis.
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Clicks 3.33 4.27 0 2 5 36 0
Price 304.88 106.84 229.99 279.98 396.63 601.95 104.57
Shipping 4.16 4.50 0 3.95 5.82 17.63 0
Total Price 309.04 107.01 234.42 283.94 396.63 607.77 108.10
Number of Sellers 4.05 2.93 2 3 6 15 1
Location on Screen 3.40 2.43 1 3 5 15 1







Total Number of Products 18
Total Number of Firms 19
Total Number of Dates 111
Total Number of Observations 6151













Toshiba E740 WIFI -1.75 0.272 -0.214 4 216 2.093
(8.64)** (3.23)** (2.35)*
HP Compaq IPAQ 1910 -3.281 -0.591 -0.215 2 171 3.012
(5.68)** (4.73)** (2.29)*
HP Compaq IPAQ 1940 -14.691 -0.165 -0.255 4 898 8.942
(20.39)** (13.98)** (4.45)**
HP Compaq IPAQ 2210 -11.725 -0.058 -0.251 1 184 6.652
(10.54)** (2.04)* (2.43)*
HP Compaq IPAQ 3950 1.961 -0.351 -0.152 3 91 1.462
(1.56) (1.02) (0.62)
HP Compaq IPAQ 3970 -1.53 -0.262 -0.12 4 131 1.809
(1.91) (3.10)** (1.14)
HP Compaq IPAQ 5550 -13.712 -0.153 -0.288 4 851 8.055
(22.97)** (13.92)** (5.17)**
Palm m515 -2.503 -0.458 -0.444 2 44 1.091
(3.88)** (0.99) (2.82)**
Sony Clie NX70V -2.455 -0.227 -0.116 3 164 2.354
(9.41)** (2.99)** (0.91)
Sony Clie NX73V -5.941 -0.258 -0.163 4 501 4.928
(10.82)** (7.18)** (1.73)
Sony Clie NZ90 -2.884 -0.144 -0.331 4 151 1.821
(1.51) (0.82) (1.60)
Sony Clie SJ22 -3.263 -0.085 -0.278 4 368 3.728
(8.65)** (3.04)** (3.54)**
Sony Clie SJ33 0.182 -0.215 2 44 1.045
(0.08) (1.51)
Sony Clie TG50 -6.188 -0.049 -0.202 4 428 5.178
(6.28)** (1.22) (1.87)
Handspring Treo 90 -4.375 -0.723 -0.225 2 136 1.985
(1.67) (0.79) (2.92)**
Palm Tungsten T2 -6.096 -0.153 -0.265 4 678 6.587
(11.90)** (6.30)** (3.04)**
Palm Tungsten W -3.902 -0.328 -0.406 4 295 3.115
(4.37)** (4.08)** (2.30)*
Palm Zire 71 -11.115 -0.157 -0.316 4 800 7.978
(11.47)** (7.71)** (3.65)**
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 5%. ** Significant at 1%.
Table 2: Product Specific EstimatesModel 1 Model 2
Likelihood Specification for Clicks Poisson PML Poisson PML
Log Total Price -4.61 -3.761
(8.91)** (7.45)**
Log Total Price x (Number of Sellers − 1) -0.288
(4.14)**
Number of Sellers 1.593
(4.05)**
Position on Screen -0.186 -0.175
(4.54)** (4.47)**




Product Dummies 17 17
Month Dummies 4 4
Product x Month Dummies 55 55
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Firm Yes Yes
Observations 6151 6151
Overdispersion Test                  Test Statistic 2656.46 2488.77
P-Value 0 0
Table 3: Continuous Clicks Specifications
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Likelihood Specification for Clicks Poisson PML Poisson PML Poisson CML Poisson CML
Log Total Price -2.459 -2.386 -2.446 -2.449
(9.11)** (9.64)** (23.78)** (23.75)**
Log Total Price x (Number of Sellers − 1) -0.252 -0.289 -0.175 -0.173
(4.60)** (5.44)** (9.94)** (9.83)**
Jump from Shoppers 0.603 0.591 0.599 0.6
(7.11)** (6.61)** (26.60)** (26.55)**
Number of Sellers 1.415 1.614 0.98 0.97
(4.52)** (5.31)** (9.93)** (9.82)**
Position on Screen -0.175 -0.174 -0.149 -0.149
(4.37)** (4.46)** (21.61)** (21.32)**
Bricks and Clicks Retailer 0.321 0.317 0.367
(2.41)* (2.43)* (-1.87)
Weekend -0.268 -0.272 -0.263 -0.263
(13.79)** (14.24)** (15.44)** (15.43)**
Product Dummies 17 17 17 17
Month Dummies 4 4 4 4
Product x Month Dummies 55 55 55 55
US Product Rank Dummies No 52 52 52
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Firm Yes Yes No No
Controls for Unobserved Firm Heterogeneity No No 19 19
Random Effects Fixed Effects
Observations 6151 6151 6151 6151
Overdispersion Test                       Test Statistic 1942.27 1822.4
P-Value 0 0
Note: z statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%
Table 4: Discontinuous Clicks SpecificationsModel 1 Model 2
Likelihood Specification for Clicks Poisson PML Poisson PML
Log Total Price -3.311 -2.091
(5.97)** (5.99)**
Log Total Price x (Number of Sellers − 1) -0.358 -0.309
(4.74)** (5.12)**
Jump from Shoppers 0.609
(6.51)**
Log Geometric Mean of Rival's Prices 0.809 0.38
(1.89) (1.21)
Absence of  Rivals Dummy 4.537 1.839
(1.92) (1.04)
Number of Sellers 1.973 1.718
(4.60)** (4.99)**
Position on Screen -0.174 -0.175
(4.55)** (4.49)**




Product Dummies 17 17
Month Dummies 4 4
Product x Month Dummies 55 55
US Product Rank Dummies 52 52
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Firm Yes Yes
Observations 6151 6151
Joint test of continuous cross-price effects
Test Statistic 4.76 10.96
P-Value 0.093 0.004
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 5%. ** Significant at 1%.
Table 5: Clicks Specifications with Cross Price EffectsModel 1 Model 2
Likelihood Specification for Clicks Negative Binomial ML Negative Binomial ML
Log Total Price -4.81 -3.696
(10.29)** (8.66)**
Log Total Price x (Number of Sellers − 1) -0.343
(5.54)**
Number of Sellers 1.897
(5.37)**
Position on Screen -0.178 -0.166
(4.70)** (4.46)**




Product Dummies 17 17
Month Dummies 4 4
Product x Month Dummies 55 55
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Firm Yes Yes
Observations 6151 6151
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%
Table A1: Continuous Clicks - Alternative SpecificationsModel 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Likelihood Specification for Clicks Negative Binomial ML Negative Binomial ML Negative Binomial CML Negative Binomial CML
Log Total Price -2.343 -2.304 -2.334 -2.333
(8.18)** (8.89)** (16.72)** (16.64)**
Log Total Price x (Number of Sellers − 1) -0.314 -0.342 -0.168 -0.165
(5.38)** (5.95)** (7.22)** (7.09)**
Jump from Shoppers 0.619 0.608 0.578 0.579
(8.24)** (7.78)** (18.92)** (18.84)**
Number of Sellers 1.77 1.912 0.932 0.918
(5.30)** (5.82)** (7.15)** (7.02)**
Position on Screen -0.166 -0.165 -0.145 -0.144
(4.31)** (4.35)** (15.93)** (15.57)**
Bricks and Clicks Retailer 0.324 0.319 0.272
(2.66)** (2.64)** (2.81)**
Weekend -0.29 -0.297 -0.247 -0.247
(14.86)** (15.13)** (10.96)** (10.95)**
Product Dummies 17 17 17 17
Month Dummies 4 4 4 4
Product x Month Dummies 55 55 55 55
US Product Rank Dummies No 52 52 52
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Firm Yes Yes No No
Controls for Unobserved Firm Heterogeneity No No 19 19
Random Effects Fixed Effects
Observations 6151 6151 6151 6151
Table A2: Discontinuous Clicks - Alternative Specifications
Note: z statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%